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Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading. By Charles E. Clark. St. Paul,
West Publishing Co., 1928. pp. viii, 581.
Thoughtful students of American administration of justice must welcome
this book, both for itself and as a sign of the times.
Hypertrophy of procedure has been characteristic of American law.
The English law which we received was for the greatest part land law
and procedure. The trial lawyer was the leader of the profession and our
ideas of a legal practitioner took form for local courts in which procedure
and swaying juries were the chief considerations. Several circumstances
aggravated the resulting condition in the formative period of our legal
institutions. One was the prevailing apprentice-training of- lawyers,
whether in law offices or in schools in which the methods, aims, and spirit
of office training were continued. This, along with the general lack of
law libraries, led to development of local law and local procedure. Story
checked this development as to the substantive law. But it went on un-
checked as to procedure and was given impetus successively by at least
four later features of our legal history.
Pioneer communities, as they arose and grew into new states in the
course of our westward expansion across the continent, were in some sort
caves of Adullam. The Adullamites had control of the fashioning of local
law and local institutions, and were not minded to allow their creditors
to pursue them into the wilderness. Their most effective defensive weapon
was a technical procedure, not over-refined like the inherited common-law
procedure, so as to require libraries and a baggage of antiquated learning
beyond reach of the rural practitioner, yet abounding in pit-falls and in
opportunities for taking a case away from the merits. By and large the
simpler pioneer communities tended to work out the more involved pro-
cedure; the more refined communities moved toward the simpler procedure.
Next came the rise of great public service companies, the passing of leader-
ship in the profession to the "railroad lawyer," and the unofficial differentia-
tioii into professional defendant's lawyers and their correlative the pro-
fessional plaintiff's lawyers. The professional defender found the pro-
cedure of the Adullamites at hand and availed himself of it. Procedure
was his weapon as jury prejudice and jury lawlessness were the weapons
of the plaintiff's lawyer. They agreed in resisting all discretion in the
judge. The court was to be held down to the minimum of interference
with the game so as to give the defendant the maximum of advantage
of procedural difficulties and vested rights in the procedural errors of
his opponent, and give the plaintiff the maximum of advantage of free
rein to advocacy and unfettered powers in the jury. Jeffersonian democ-
racy, along with pioneer faith in versatility and pioneer disbelief in special-
ists, putting the judges in most of the states into politics and in too many
jurisdictions allowing counsel to dominate the trial, fortified our inherited
distrust of discretion and led to legislation tying down the courts on every
side and prescribing rigidly details of practice where, nevertheless, courts
were given free rein to develop the substantive law by e.xperience of the
needs of justice in concrete Gases.
Still later, in our older and larger cities, came the rise of the client-
caretaker, as the leader of the bar, and consequent withdrawal of the
best minds in the profession from contact with the every-day work of
the courts. Thus in a time of economic unification, when the substantive
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law tends more and more to uniformity, procedure remains provincial
and localized, so that a senator of the United States, representing the
traditional view of the last generation, can resist the efforts of the Amer-
ican Bar Association for the simplification of federal procedure as in-
volving a threat to the local bars.
A book for beginners which approaches legal procedure not as an arbi-
trary mass of rules analogous to those governing estates in land, not
as a body of historically given fundamental propositions from -which, as
idealized by courts and text writers, we may never depart, but as a system
of precepts devised and administered for certain ends, and to be judged
and developed with reference to those ends, is a hopeful sign of better
things.
Common-law pleading emphasized the function of formulating the issue
(or an issue) because of the exigencies of the mechanical modes of trial
which obtain in the beginnings of law. As these mechanical modes of
trial became obsolete and jury trial changed from a mechanical to a
rational proceeding, the issues formulated ceased to be the real issues.
An issue was reached. But it was likely to be formal or even fictitious,
leaving the real issues to come out at the trial of the formal issues. The
earlier codes of civil procedure sought to supersede this formal issue
pleading by emphasizing the statement of "ultimate facts." But this, too,
became formal. A set of pleadings was likely in practice to raise a great
variety of apparent issues from which the real issues had to be sifted at
the trial and (subject to many technicalities) in the charge of the court.
In the present generation the emphasis has been shifting steadily to the
notice function of pleading; and it is not the least merit of Professor
Clark's book that he has recognized this and, without dogmatism or
propagandist argument, has shaped his book as a whole and his treat-
ment of details accordingly.
Perhaps the least satisfactory parts of the work are sections 2-5, treat-
ing of Roman legal procedure, Continental legal procedure, and, very
summarily, the historical background of our own procedure at common-
law and in equity. One needs to be a master of the subject in order to
write about Roman procedure and Continental procedure in short compass
for American readers. Few common-law lawyers are prepared for sivch
a task. Nor are many prepared to write broad sketches of bits of our
own legal history. It takes a master to make a few bold strokes with
assurance. I suspect that the reason for the single-issue doctrine was not
that the jury was composed of laymen (§4) but the requirements of the
old mechanical modes of trial, of which originally trial by jury was one.
One may see analogous phenomena in Aristotle's discussion of a "divided
verdict" and in the doctrines of the Roman strict law as to plus pot ito.
Also, although the last century no doubt exaggerated the Germanic ele-
ment, one may hardly leave out of account the Germanic distinction
between the issue term and the trial term nor the course of framing the
issue in Germanic law, when he comes to compare the Roman formulation
by a magistrate with our formulation by the parties through alternate
pleadings until a traverse is joined in. And as to equity pleading, one
might suggest that the prolixity which obtained in England was a legacy
of the eighteenth century even of formal over-refinement, while the rigidity
which tended to obtain in the United States was due to lack of acquaint-
ance with equity in our formative era and consequent assimilation of
equity practice to practice at common law.
When he enters on his real task, however, the author is on sure ground
and has given us a handbook which is in many ways a model. He makes
no attempt at specious generalization of heterogeneous materials, yet is
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not afraid to generalize where generalization is fruitful. He is not afraid
to criticize, yet keeps criticisn in bounds in view of the demands of a hand-
book. He is not deceived by the illusory certainty by which the last gn-
eration set so much store. Thus he can give an analytical account of code
pleading as it is, with an eye to what it is becoming, tempered, by the
necessary historical cautions and yet affording possibilities for improve-
ment by constant reference to the purposes of procedure and measuring
of rules and doctrines by the ends to be met. Such a book, studied
generally by those who are to go into the practice in the code states
is not unlikely to achieve more than new codes and practice acts, however
well drawn, administered in the spirit of the last century.
Particular mention should be made of the distinction between issue
pleading, fact pleading, and notice pleading, which is carried through the
whole book, and is made to bring the different problems into relation.
This is in desirable contrast with the older method of treating each prob-
lem by itself with no unifying principle beyond history, usually em-
ployed only by treating the several code provisions as the culminations
of a course of development along lines fixed in the common law.
It requires some hardihood in an author to approach in this fashion
a subject so peculiarly in the realm of the practitioner, and it is not
surprising that Professor Clark has not always had the entire courage
of his convictions. One must not accept at its face value the claim for
common-law pleading that "the exact issue had to be defined" (§ 11).
Rather it was an issue exact in form. Consider the general issue in eject-
ment, in replevin, in indebtah's assumpsit. Nor should one be too ready
to admit that a "system of pleading the facts" was substituted by the
codes (§ 11). For at one end code pleading was turned back toward the
common-law ideal by the doctrine of the theory of the pleading, while
at the other end it has tended, without legislative aid, to run into notice
pleading. As he rightly says (p. 29), "there is not so much a change
in the kind of pleading as a change in emphasis." But the emphasis when
placed with reference to the ends to be served is decisive. I doubt very
much the assertion (§ 11) that our law of procedure is tending toward
the procedure of the civil law, where pleading is in terms of asserted
rights, as distinguished from demanded relief. Rather I suspect that both
our law and the civil law are moving in the same direction. We have been
giving over the quest for formal issues, due to the old mechanical modes
of trial, and more and more making the pleadings give notice. Pleading
in the civil law has been giving over the sharp distinctions that go with
the closing of the roll, which likewise go back to the demands of archaic
procedure, and has been coming toward notice as the basis of the asserted
rights.
Equally bold and wholly praiseworthy is Professor Clark's constant
sense of the futility of attempts at rigid analytical working out of the
practical questions which arise in procedure. For example, the criterion
as to jury trials under a regime of one form of action must be historical,
tempered by consideration of .the purpose of the constitutional provisions
as to jury trial and of how that purpose may be achieved practically.
This is shown by the phraseology in many constitutions which guarantee
the right to jury trial "as heretofore enjoyed." Sometimes the constitu-
tional provision must be the sole guide. Sometimes it is supplemented by
statutes which adopt the historical criterion. Sometimes it is supple-
mented by statutes seeking to make an exhaustive, detailed enumeration
of the cases which are for a jury. Sometimes the courts have sought
to provide such a detailed enumeration by means of a rigid analytical
criterion involving the conception of the theory of the pleading. The result
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has been confusion and exaggeration of procedural niceties and difficulties.
The original New York Code of Civil Procedure speaks from an era of
extravagant attempts to commit all things to juries and unfettered advo-
cacy, of which our procedure was full, down to the end of the last century.
Another example may be seen in analytical conceptions of "cause of
action," a typical example of the nineteenth century jurisprudence of con-
ceptions. Oil the one hand there is the definition of "cause of action" in
terms of right-duty relation-a phase of the attempt to resolve all
things in terms of "a right," so conspicious in Holland's Elements of
Jurisprudence. On the other hand, there is the view of "cause of action"
in terms of a controversy in fact; as a state of facts out of which contro-
versy arises, to be diagnosed finally for purposes of relief when the time
for judgment comes. The single-right theory, really an exotic from the
modern Roman law, is not only untenable under the authorities, but is
due to the exigencies of analytical teaching. As Professor Clark well
says, in any of its forms it yields only an illusory certainty. It is vain
to seek to treat procedure after the manner of the law of real property.
Perhaps one further suggestion might be added to the excellent treatment
of the doctrine of the theory of the pleading. In Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind.
96 (1883) (cited in § 43, note 136) ideas of common-law pleading were
applied to equity pleading under the code. Something of this sort had
been going on in equity pleading in England before the middle of the
nineteenth century. A tendency to a doctrine of the theory of the bill
begins with Hiem v. Mill, 13 Ves. Jr. 114, 119, in the Jarndyco and Jarn-
dyce era of equity. But there was nothing in the code to call for it and
it was not a doctrine of equity pleading before the code. Here again the
law teacher made mischief. Bliss (Code Pleading, § 8) made a "natural"
(i. e., ideal?) classification of code actions out of Chitty's division of
personal actions into actions in form er delicto and in form ex contraotu
(1 Chitty, Pleading (1808) 85). Chitty's formal distinction was made
into a natural distinction by teachers and text writers and for a season
was written into the codes.
A few small matters remain to be noted. One feels at times that, in his
conscientious and laudable endeavors to bring together all the m~terials
on both sides, Professor Clark treats all print as created free and equal.
See, for example, the American opinions as to the success of the English
practice under the Judicature Act, cited in section 6, note 44.
On page 25, line three of the text, I suppose "remembered" is a clerical
error for "amended."
In section 13 it is perhaps a bit misleading to say that "ordinarily"
there is "a simple written summons signed by the plaintiff or his attorney."
It is true of ten states, on in substance, eleven. It is an alternative in two
more. But it is not true in twelve code states, including such important
jurisdictions as California, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio.
Nor is the question as to jury trial in probate appeals quite as simple as
it is made to seem in section 16. It should be remembered that the validity
of a will as to real estate was passed on by a jury on an issue of devisavil
vel non.
Professor Clark's book brings out admirably what has been accomplished
for improvement of pleading in the present generation. It shows the lines
on which that improvement must go forward. Its influence will be good
in every direction. I hope it will be widely read by students and con-
sulted and pondered over by judges and practitioners.
Roscoe POUND.
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The Drafting of the Covenant. By David Hunter Miller. With an intro-
duction by Nicholas Murray Butler. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1928. Vol. I, pp. viii, 555. Vol II, pp. 857.
Two or three books which have been published so far since the Con-
ference of Paris which put an end to the War of 1914, have revealed
to the world some of the details and of the not generally lmown motives
to which the pact of the Society of Nations answered in its elaboration.
The whole of this work was hedged in with great secrecy, and not evcn the
minutes of the Commission which was entrusted with its preparation were
published, although printed as fast as they were adopted. Those of us
who were familiar -with them through having helped as plenipotentiaries
of one or other of the belligerent nations in the Peace covenant, took
cognizance with a certain amount of astonishment of definite versions
which the press and even some books often adopted.
Today, thanks to this most useful and complete work by Mr. David
Hunter Miller, the situation is completely changed. The documents from
which the Covenant was to take rise, from the Phillimore plan of the
20th of March, 1918, down to each and every one of the proceedings of
the Commission, including the four te.ts proposed by President Wilson,
are all inserted word for word in volume II, whilst the first volume con-
tains day by day and act by act the history of its elaboration.
The work is written by a man who played a most important part in
all these proceedings as member of the North American Delegation and
who, with Mr. Hurst, gave his name to the transactional project which
served as a basis for the one which was approved by the Commission and,
consequently, for the present pact. And as the author had the happy
idea of taking notes of what was taking place before him, officially as
well as in private, there are to be found in his work more than one most
curious anecdote as well as several important episodes which throw great
light on what took place during those months in which the Treaty of Ver-
sailles was elaborated and which were equally filled with hope and anicty
for a large part of the civilized world. We may boldly assert that in the
future it will be impossible to write the history of this most transcendental
peace, which occupies in the 20th century a place analogous to that of
Westphalia in the 17th, or to that of Vienna in the 19th, without con-
sulting and commentating upon Mr. IMiller's work. It is not a mere store
of dates and conversations, as are usually to be found in memoirs, but
the work of a writer worthy of the name, who knows how to add to the
narration of facts sagacious remarks and most useful teachings.
The number of collaborators in the Covenant of the League of Nations
and their diverse training, some being politicians, others lawyers and
others again Government officials explains why the results of that Covenant
may e-tend into very different spheres and is adapting itself to all kinds
of evolutions. There is a purely political aspect to it, in which the
European situation resulting from the war is finding the means of rezolv-
ing some of its most serious difficulties and of smoothing out differences
of opinion between the smaller and the greater powers, the results of
which might be very serious were it not for this means of action. Another
of its aspects is a social one in international relations, substituting the
informal conversation in unavoidable and fruitful interviews in place
of diplomatic correspondence, in which latter aggressiveness and concilia-
tion often crop up out of season; still another of its aspects is an ad-
ministrative one, in that it renders formal and intensifies the common
work of maintaining close touch in every department from that of the
post and telegraph to that of industrial property and of sanitary co-
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operation. It is gradually changing the moral and material solidarity
of the universe into a legal one; and many other multifarious aspects
are constantly cropping up which have on certain occasions brought to-
gether on the committees at Geneva people who seemed on certain occasions
most opposed to the objects and even to the existence of the Pact.
Perhaps the greatest merit of the great idealistic and humanitarian
work, which has been more or less perfectly realised, and which this book
describes step by step, is precisely its elasticity, which has made it pos-
sible to adapt it every day to fresh collective requirements, and which
makes its universal acceptance possible for certain ends, though for others,
in the end, continental or regional groups which already exist in fact
impose themselves.
At the end of the second volume, in addition to a detailed alphabetical
index, there is another which follows the order of the articles of the Pact
and which gives in detail all the pages of both volumes on which reference
is made to each one of them. It is of great practical use in consulting
this work and will necessarily be of great service to all those who may
search in it for light on any special point.
Whatever may be one's opinion concerning the League of Nations, and
while recognizing that its creation and management are bound, like every
other human institution, to give rise from time to time to criticism favor-
able or adverse, this most important publication by Mr. Miller is bound
to make it well known and will occupy a favored place in every library
consecrated to the subject of which it treats. International Law has been
enriched by it.
The Hague. ANTONIO S. DE BUSTAMENTn.
Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure. By Armistead M. Dobie.
St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1928. pp. xiii, 1151.
In view of the many existing books on particular phases of federal
jurisdiction and procedure, many of which contain several volumes, the
broad and detailed subject matter contained in this new addition to the
Hornbook Series is a rather extraordinary accomplishment in itself. Prob-
ably there does not exist any other single volume which gives so com-
plete and thorough a picture of the federal judicial system as a whole.
Indeed, an outstanding feature is the painstaking care with which the
leading authorities and other source materials have been collected in a
series of footnotes which makes it possible for any one particularly in-
terested in some special phase of the subject to further pursue his study
and inquiry.
The author is at his best in discussing that body of principles having
to do with the jurisdiction of the district courts. The chapters on diversity
of citizenship, cases involving federal questions and removal jurisdiction
and procedure are gems.
Those interested in the development of a more cohesive system of
procedural jurisprudence throughout the United States will attach much
significance to Professor Dobie's discussion of proposed or possible reforms.
It is evident that these important matters are constantly in his mind; and
the fact that he discusses them at all, in a text book prepared primarily
for practitioners, and only incidentally for students (see p. v), is a dis-
tinct and most welcome departure from what may be called the modern
text book tendency.
There are probably comparatively few persons in the country so well
equipped by training, research and experience, to discuss these proposed
or possible reforms. And yet in almost every instance the discussion is
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rather brief and cryptic. Just enough to whet one's appetite, and to leave
one with some sense of incompleteness. Thus the learned author hints
at the desirability of perhaps abolishing diversity of citizenship as a
ground of jurisdiction in view of the steady progress toward the elimina-
tion of "prejudice against the stranger litigant in the courts of a state;"
and he mentions, in passing, the great change in the social and economic
life of the various communities brought about by "integrated industries
and improved transportation facilities.' The congestion of the federal
district courts, the continual cry for more federal judges and other cir-
cumstances would make some elaboration on this subject exceedingly in-
teresting reading.
There is probably no more important and necessary reform in federal
procedure than the prompt passage of some federal statute which shall
give the Supreme Court the power to prescribe uniform rules governing
the practice and procedure in actions at law in the federal district courts.
This subject receives a mere three pages of discussion.
On the subject of admiralty jurisdiction the most interesting, and prob-
ably most confusing development, beginning with KEzicl:kcrbocl:cr Ice Co.
v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 433 (1920), and continued in State
of Washington v. W. G. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 44 Sup. Ct. 002
(1924), and Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v,. Dahld 266 U. S. 449, 45 Sup.
Ct. 157 (1924), is stated so briefly as to leave a reader, unfamiliar with
the subject, largely uninformed concerning the importance of the subject,
the doubts which remain to perplex one, and the probable bearing of this
line of decisions upon other phases of admiralty law.
No doubt Professor Dobie would at once state that he would have been
only too pleased to discuss these and many other kindred subjects had the
space and opportunity been available. We may, nevertheless, express our
disappointment at not learning his views more fully.
One of the striking features of the book is the careful and entirely
successful attempt to set forth the general rules and provisions governing
federal procedure, civil and criminal, rather than to content himself with
a full discussion on the subjects of jurisdiction and a mere curzory treat-
ment of the practice and procedure. While many of the statements re-
garding the practice and procedure are of a purely formal character, they
are fully and accurately set forth and they add greatly to the general
usefulness of the book.
HAzom R. MEDI u.
The Neutrality of thw Netherlands during the World War. By Amry
Vandenbosch. Grand Rapids, Mich., Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1927. pp. 349.
While some persons are thoughtlessly asserting that war has been "out-
lawed" in the sense that it is now a status outside the law and devoid
of legal regulation, and while others are taking the view that the tradi-
tional legal system of neutrality is obsolete in view of the exdstence of the
League of Nations, it is of great value to international lawyers to have
Professor Vandenboseh's scholarly study of the neutrality of the Nether-
lands during the World War. With full paraphrases or quotations from
the diplomatic correspondence, the author has presented in carefully
organized form a clear picture of the difficulties confronting a small neu-
tral state and of the courageous and skillful struggle of the Netherlands
Government to preserve its neutrality in the trying times of 1914 to 191.
Professor Vandenbosch has utilized the Dutch Orange Bools and White
Books, numerous British Parliamentary Papers, the published war cor-
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respondence. of the Government of the United States and other official data
in addition to much secondary material.
The book has three major divisions dealing respectively with Enforce-
ment of Neutral Duties, Controversies Over Neutral Rights, and a General
Estimate of the Dutch Neutrality Regulations. Under each of the first
two of these main divisions the material is admirably grouped into such
topics as Transit of Military Materials, Admission of Belligerent War-
ship, Blockade and Retaliation, Destruction of Neutral Prizes, and the
like. In treating each of these questions the author takes up separately
the controversies between the Netherlands and the various belligerent
governments, follows the presentation of the factual side with a brief
survey of the existing rules of international law and concludes with an
estimate of the soundness of the Dutch position. In addition there are
eleven appendices containing the texts of the more important Dutch regu-
lations, an index and a good bibliography.
In regard to the presentation of the factual data, Chapter VIII on the
Admission of Belligerent Armed Merchantmen, Chapter XII on the Right
of Asylum-The Case of the Kaiser, the data on the Netherlands Oversea
Trust Company in Chapter XIII, and Chapter XVI on Neutral Convoy
are of particular interest. But the contributions made by the author's
study are by no means confined to these topics. His disagreement with the
British retaliatory actions, with the Allied system of "blockade" and with
the German war zones are to be welcomed. Even where the reader dis-
agrees with the author's conclusions he is grateful for the added light
thrown upon the problem and for the fair, open minded analysis of national
views and pretensions. Throughout the book a great service is rendered
by indicating the defects which practice revealed in the Hague Conven-
tions and by suggesting the lines along which at some future conference
they may be improved. The reviewer subscribes to Professor Vandenbosch's
statements that:
"The Dutch regulations with respect to certain phases of neutral duties
have a singular importance, for they indicate a veritable evolution of
neutral duties along the lines of fundamental principles previously estab-
lished. Out of the diplomatic controversies with respect to the Dutch
regulations concerning aircraft, radio, internment of both property and
belligerent persons coming upon neutral territory, the treatment of prison-
ers of war interned on its territory by mutual agreement of the belliger-
ents, the non-admission of warships, belligerent armed merchant-men, and
prizes, have come clearer conceptions of neutral duties under modern
conditions of warfare. These will form a useful working basis for the
re-codification of the laws of neutrality on land which is so urgently
needed."
One may add that the presentatioq of this data in so clear and accessible
a form constitutes an additional service to the future of the international
law of war and neutrality.
PILIP C. JESSUP.
Appellate Practice and Procedure in the Supreme Court of the United
States. By Reynolds Robertson. New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1928.
pp. xxxix, 360.
The number of cases which the Supreme Court of the United States
is called upon to consider is relatively small in comparison with the entire
volume of litigation that is pending in the various appellate courts of
this country at any given time. And it is necessarily true, therefore, that
the average practitioner rarely finds himself before the nation's highest
tribunal. When, however, it becomes necessary for him to seek or to
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resist a review by the United States Supreme Court he finds himself
confronted by many practical questions of procedure and practice. The
aim of Mr. Robertson's handbook is to answer those questions: " * 0 to at
down a chronological outline of the steps necessary to be taken, both
in the lower courts and in the Supreme Court, in order to perfect a writ
of error or appeal to the Supreme Court, or to apply for a writ of certiorari
from that Court." The volume assumes that the practitioner has deter-
mined upon the proper remedy and seeks "to suggest the usual procedura
to be followed in perfecting his application, filing his case in the Supreme
Court, and conducting it while there, with regard to the statuteZ, the
rules, the decisions, and the established practice."
The Act of February 13, 1925, amending the Judicial Code, greatly
increased the number of cases that may be reviewed only on writ of
certiorari. Since the enactment of that statute, comparatively few cascs
are subject to review by the Supreme Court as a matter of right. Sb:
of the sixteen chapters in this book are devoted to the writ of certiorari,
and it is treated in minute detail from the viewpoint of both the peti-
tioner and the respondent. The steps to be taken by counsel for the
petitioner are set forth, and each step is discussed and explaincd by refer-
ence to the controlling statutes, rules and decisions. Various contingen-
cies that may preclude a consideration of the petition on its merits are
mentioned, with suggestions as to how to avoid them. The distinction
between the writ of certiorari to a state court and to the several federal
courts is shown, as is also the procedure to be followed in obtaining a
stay of the mandate of the lower court pending an application for cer-
tiorari. The duties of the respondent are also fully explained.
The practice on writ of error, appeal, and certified questions is likewise
discussed in detail. The final chapters are devoted to motions, briefs,
the argument and submission of cases, and to opinions, judgmcnts, man-
dates, and rehearings.
The Act of January 31, 1928, abolishing the writ of error to fcderal
courts, was passed after the book had gone to press. The probable effect
of that Act is discussed in an appendix. This discussion is particularly
valuable in view of the fact that the statute has not yet been construed
by the Supreme Court.
This volume does not purport to be a treatise on federal practice;
it is a manual written in simple form and designed to serve as a practical
guide for the practitioner in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Through long experience as an assistant in the office of the Clerl: of
the Court, the author is peculiarly well qualified to write such a hand-
book. It contains many valuable forms and much material that has
never before been published, and the practitioner will find it an invaluable
aid in its field. It will save him much time and expense and will re-
lieve him of considerable perplexity and anxiety. Of perhaps equal im-
portance to the careful lawyer is the fact that it will enable him to
follow the approved and customary method.
Birmingham, Ala. DOUGLAS AmuuaT.
Some Lessons from our Legal History. By William Searle Holdsworth.
New York, The Macmillan Co., 1928. pp. viii, 190.
Professor Holdsworth's thesis is that rules of law, both substantive
and procedural, have come into existence as the result of a long series
of experiments. The method has been that of trial and error. From this, it
follows that a knowledge of the experiments-of the efforts to secure effec-
tive means for a desired end-is a valuable, nay a necessary, part of
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the equipment of a student of law. He proves his thesis abundantly
with a wealth of learning, discussing events, statutes, decisions, works on
legal philosophy, etc. with enviable knowledge and skill.
His work also proves the thesis that the fact that an institution or
rule of law exists is prima facie evidence that it is effective, and that
it is f6r the advocates of change to show that the change proposed has
not been tried before, and found wanting, and that there is a reasQnablo
basis, other than novelty, for an anticipation that improvement will follow
change.
The examples he cites of the frequent failure of institutions trans-
planted from one culture to another, furnish a key to the fault which
underlies Henry Ford's criticism of experts, i. e., that their chief activity
is to point out, often mistakenly, what cannot be done. The causes of
the success or failure of experiments in law or other institutions are so
numerous and complex, that it is easy to ascribe success or failure to
the law or institution itself, when, in fact, opposite results would follow
if the conditions of race, culture, etc. surrounding the experiment were
changed. Failure of Parliamentary Government in Italy does not con-
demn it, just as its success in Great Britain does not prove it the only
possible governmental method.
Hence, a law or an institution may have succeeded in spite of its weak-
nesses which should be cured, or may have failed in spite of its excellencies.
It is disheartening to realize that most of the readers of Professor
Holdsworth's book will come from among those who need its teachings
least, and that the truths he demonstrates, as for instance, the vital need
of a judiciary who are the equals or superiors in learning and skill of
the men who practice before them, cannot be brought home to the public,
so that it will demand and be willing to pay for judges of this class.
It would be presumptuous to attempt to criticise Professor Holdsworth
in his discussion of legal history and its place in the world of kmowledgo.
To do so would require a knowledge at least a tithe of his in extent and
accuracy. The non-expert reader of these lectures finds delight in the
breadth of the author's learning, and the skill with which he uses it.
A short quotation shows his general attitude, and his subtle humor.
"Philosophical speculation about law and politics is an attractive pur-
suit. More especially is it attractive to the young. A small knowledge
of the rules of law, a sympathy with hardships which have been observed
and a little ingenuity, are sufficient to make a very pretty theory. I
is a harder task to become a master of Anglo-American law, by using
the history of that law to discover the principles which underlie its rules
and to elucidate the manner in which these principles have been developed
and adapted to meet the infinite complexities of life in different ages.
But those who have chosen to endure this harder task have chosen the
better part. * * * These students of our law will thus learn, even though
it is only at second hand, something of the practical wisdom which comes
from knowledge of affairs. They will, for that reason, be able to suggest
solutions of present problems -which will depend not merely on their own
unaided genius, but on the accumulated wisdom of the past; * * *. But,
being students of modern law, and cognizant of modern conditions, they
will not overlook the modern theories of legal and political philosophers.'
HARRISON HEWITT.
